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Abstract
In the face of seemingly intractable territorial and maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea, the article examines how the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (LOSC), sets out what maritime claims States can make in the South China 
Sea and how it establishes a framework that will enable States to either negotiate mari-
time boundary agreements or negotiate joint development arrangements (JDAs) in 
areas of overlapping maritime claims. It provides an avenue whereby the maritime 
claims of the claimants can be brought into line with international law, potentially 
allowing for meaningful discussions on cooperation and maritime joint development 
based on areas of overlapping maritime claims defined on the basis of the LOSC.
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 Introduction
The South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes are commonly viewed as 
“intractable” and joint development of maritime areas subject to overlapping 
jurisdictional claims is often offered as a potential way forward. An enduring 
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obstacle to the establishment of joint management mechanisms has, however, 
been the question of precisely where such joint zones should be located. This 
issue has been made especially problematic because of the lack of clarity in the 
maritime claims of the parties. This article seeks to address this central, prob-
lematic issue and offers a potentially “game-changing” route towards a clearer 
definition of the areas of overlapping claims—something that has the poten-
tial to contribute substantially to de-escalating these disputes and is an essen-
tial precursor to the realisation of maritime joint development in the South 
China Sea.1 This article examines how the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC)2 sets out what maritime claims States can make in 
the South China Sea and how it establishes a framework that will enable States 
to either negotiate maritime boundary agreements or negotiate joint develop-
ment arrangements ( JDAs) in areas of overlapping maritime claims.
The analysis is based on the view that the States claiming sovereignty 
over the islands in the South China Sea (the Claimants) will not be able to 
resolve the territorial sovereignty disputes through negotiations for the fore-
seeable future. It is also considered that they will not be willing to give their 
consent to refer the sovereignty disputes to an international court or arbitral 
tribunal and ask that court or tribunal to determine which State has the better 
claim to sovereignty. Consequently, we have not attempted to analyse the mer-
its of the sovereignty claims to the disputed islands. Nor have we attempted 
to analyse the legal issues in a wider geopolitical context. The proposals made 
here offer avenues whereby the maritime claims of the South China Sea 
Claimants can be brought into conformity with the LOSC. It is recognised that 
for this to be achieved, political will on the part of the Claimants is essential. 
We are, however, firmly of the view that the parties to the South China Sea 
disputes have shared interests in relations that are grounded on trust, mutual 
respect, cooperation and the rule of international law. Moreover, we believe 
that the changes that we advocate can be effected at relatively limited cost 
but potentially substantial benefits to all of the South China Sea littoral States.
This article is organised as follows. First, the sovereignty and maritime claims 
in the South China Sea are summarised. Second, the prospect of  identifying 
1 The authors would like to thank Ms. Youna Lyons, Senior Research Fellow at the NUS Centre 
for International Law, for her assistance in identifying and classifying the features in the 
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. The authors are also indebted to I Made Andi Arsana 
of the Dept. of Geodetic and Geomatic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Gadjah Mada 
University, Indonesia, for his assistance in the preparation of the maps accompanying this 
article.
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 
in force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397.
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the areas of overlapping maritime claims and negotiating JDAs in the areas 
surrounding the Spratly Islands is examined. Third, an analysis of issues and 
opportunities related to specific sectors of the South China Sea is provided. 
Finally, some general conclusions are drawn on the role of the LOSC in defining 
the areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea.
 Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
 Sovereignty Claims to Offshore Geographic Features
The fundamental legal dispute in the South China Sea is about which State has 
the better claim to sovereignty over the disputed offshore islands. The LOSC 
has no provisions on how to determine competing claims to sovereignty over 
islands or other land territory. That issue is governed by the rules and prin-
ciples of customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory.3 
The LOSC provides a broad framework with respect to international law of 
the sea issues. Of particular relevance to the present discussion, the LOSC 
sets out the freedoms, rights and obligations of States on the high seas and 
in the various maritime zones measured from land territory and islands. The 
LOSC assumes that sovereignty over the land territory and islands has been 
established. Therefore, the LOSC is of no assistance in resolving the territorial 
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. Determining which coastal State 
(or States) has (or have) sovereignty over the disputed islands of the South 
China Sea is, however, directly relevant to claims to maritime jurisdiction in 
keeping with the long-standing legal maxim that “the land dominates the sea”.4
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have sovereignty 
claims to some or all of the islands in the Spratly Islands5 and Brunei may 
also claim sovereignty over one reef in the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan 
3 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) 215–244.
4 This point was emphasised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its first case concern-
ing jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. 
Netherlands, Germany v. Denmark) (1969) I.C.J. Reports 3, especially para. 19.
5 The Chinese name for the group of islands known as the Spratlys is Nansha and the 
Vietnamese name is Trường Sa. There are multiple names in Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipino 
and Malay for most of the individual features in the Spratlys. For the sake of simplicity and 
consistency, we have used only the English language versions. For a list of the names of 
the features in the Spratly Islands in the various languages, see the Gazetteer to the map 
published by the US State Department in 2010. It is available on the CIL web site at http://cil.
nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/75967_gazetteer.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014.
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and Vietnam also claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.6 None of the 
Claimants have clarified which geographic features they claim are islands as 
defined in Article 121 of the LOSC and subject to appropriation. Nor have they 
issued charts or geographic coordinates of any straight baselines relating to the 
islands from which they measure the territorial sea as required by Article 16 of 
the LOSC. Where normal baselines apply to these islands, the Claimants have 
likewise not publicised charts illustrating the location of the low-water line 
they officially recognise in accordance with Article 5 of the LOSC. They also 
have not clarified which geographic features are low-tide elevations that can 
be used as basepoints because they are wholly or partially within 12 nautical 
miles (nm) of an island.7
China has defined straight baselines around the Paracel Islands, but these 
baselines are not consistent with the LOSC and have excited international 
protests.8 Although at first glance these baselines have the appearance of being 
archipelagic baselines, under the LOSC only ‘archipelagic States’ are permitted 
to draw such baselines around mid-ocean archipelagos.9
There is also uncertainty regarding the current status of an historic claim 
of the Philippines to an excessive claim to a territorial sea. The long-standing 
position of the Philippines was that its “international treaty limits” were estab-
lished under three international treaties, namely the 1898 Treaty of Paris,10 the 
6 The Chinese name for the Paracel Islands is Xisha and the Vietnamese name is Hoàng Sa, 
and there are also names for the individual islands in English, Chinese and Vietnamese. 
For the sake of simplicity and consistency, we have used only the English language 
versions. For a list of the names of the features in the Paracel Islands in the various 
languages, see the Gazetteer to the map published by the US State Department in 2010. 
Ibid. 
7 This is permitted under Art. 13(2) of the LOSC. It is recognised that “M” is the technically 
correct abbreviation for nautical miles. However, “nm” is frequently used in the literature 
and will be employed as the abbreviation for nautical miles in this article.
8 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of 
the Territorial Sea of the People’s Republic China, 15 May 1996, available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/chn_mzn7_1996.
pdf; J. Ashley Roach and Robert Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd ed., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012) 98; See also, United States Department of State, Bureau 
of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, ‘Limits in the Sea No. 117—Straight 
Baseline Claim: China’, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.
pdf; accessed 5 April 2014.
9 China is not an “archipelagic State”; see LOSC Arts. 46 and 47(1). 
10 The Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States, signed at Paris, 10 December 
1898, TS No. 343.
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Cession Treaty of 190011 and the 1930 Treaty of Washington.12 Under Section 1 
of the 1935 Philippines Constitution, the territory of Philippines is described 
as consisting of the territory established by these treaties, with all waters from 
the baselines of the Philippines to the so-called “international treaty limits” 
being considered as the territorial sea of the Philippines.13 Consequently, at 
the furthest extent of the “box” formed by the treaty limits outlined above, the 
Philippines claimed territorial sea rights extending 285 nm from the straight 
baselines it claimed in the 1960s.14 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the international 
community, including the United States as a party to the 1898 Treaty of Paris, 
did not accept the position of the Philippines on the status of the waters inside 
the rectangular box established by the treaties.15 In response to an objection by 
Australia, the Philippines submitted a statement to the UN Secretary-General, 
dated 26 October 1988, that it would harmonise its domestic legislation with the 
LOSC.16 This harmonisation took more than 20 years. In 2009, the Philippines 
passed a new baselines law which brought its claim into conformity with the 
LOSC.17 As a result, the Philippines seems in practice to be bringing its mari-
time claims into strict conformity with the provisions of the LOSC. However, it 
has still not amended its Constitution or formally abandoned its historic mari-
time claim.
11 The Treaty between Spain and the United States for the Cession of Outlying Islands for 
the Philippines, signed at Washington, 7 November 1900, TS No. 345.
12 Convention between the United States and Great Britain Delimiting the Philippine 
Archipelago and the State of Borneo, signed at Washington, 2 January 1930, TS No. 856.
13 Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961. An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of 
the Philippines, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/PHL_1961_Act.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014. 
14 See ibid. Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, subsequently amended them through 
Republic Act No. 5446 of 18 September 1968. An Act to Amend Section One of the 
Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-Six, Entitled “An Act to Define the 
Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines”, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL_1968_Act.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014; 
See also Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005) 452. 
15 Roach and Smith  (n 8), at 146–148.
16 Ibid., at p. 222.
17 Republic Act No. 9522: An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, 
as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the 
Philippines, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on 10 March 2009 (2009) 
70 Law of the Sea Bulletin 32–35.
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 Maritime Claims from Mainland Territory
All of the States bordering the South China Sea claim an exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) measured from the baselines along their mainland coasts, or in 
the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, from archipelagic baselines.18 It is 
generally agreed that the archipelagic baselines employed by Indonesia and 
the Philippines around their main archipelago are consistent with the LOSC 
(see Fig. 1).19
Although some of the straight baselines used by China, Malaysia, Taiwan 
and Vietnam may be of questionable legality,20 and may have a substantial 
impact on the areas subject to the regimes of internal waters and territorial 
sea, they will have only moderate impact on the outer limit of the 200-nm EEZ 
claims measured from those baselines. For example, the islands that Vietnam’s 
straight baselines link can generate maritime claims in their own right. This 
means that the expansion of the potential scope of Vietnam’s EEZ is increased 
to a far more limited extent than might otherwise be presumed (see Fig. 2). 
 
18 Brunei Darussalam—Territorial Waters of Brunei Act, 1982. Indonesia—Law No. 1/1973 
Concerning Continental Shelf (6 January 1973); Law No. 5/1983 on the Indonesian 
Exclusive Economic Zone (18 October 1983); Law No. 6/1996 regarding Indonesian 
Water (8 August 1996); Government Regulations No. 38/2002 on the Geographical List of 
Coordinates of the Indonesian Archipelagic Baselines (28 June 2002) and Government 
Regulations No. 37/2008 amending Regulations No. 38/2002 (19 May 2008). Malaysia—
Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1984; Act No. 311 An Act Pertaining to the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Certain Aspects of the Continental Shelf of Malaysia and to 
Provide for the Regulations of Activities in the Zone and on the Continental Shelf and 
for Matters Connected Therewith, the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006—Act 660 
(29 December 2006) and the Territorial Sea Act 2012—Act 750 (18 June 2012). People’s 
Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 
1992; Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act, 26 June 1998. Philippines—
Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and 
for other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17). Vietnam—Statement on the Territorial 
Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12 
May 1977; Statement on the Territorial Sea Baseline of 12 November 1982, all available at the 
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) National 
Legislation Database—Asian and South Pacific States: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm; Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam, 21 
June 2012, Art. 15, available at http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/228456/the-law-of-
the-sea-of-viet-nam.html; Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, 21 January 1998; Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, 
21 January 1998, available at http://www.moi.gov.tw/english/english_law/law.aspx? 
pages=12; accessed 5 April 2014.
19 Roach and Smith (n 8), at pp. 209 and 213.
20 Ibid., at pp. 76–82.
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Therefore, the questionable use of straight baselines, while an important issue 
of concern, especially with respect to potential implications for freedom of 
navigation, is relatively unimportant with respect to identifying areas of over-
lapping maritime claims in the central part of the South China Sea.
figure 1  Baselines and maritime claims in the South China Sea
Source: Adapted from a map included in the January 2013 issue of the 
American Journal of International Law prepared by Clive Schofield and 
Andi Arsana of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and 
Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia.
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figure 2  The impact of Vietnam’s claimed straight baselines on its maritime claims21
None of the States bordering the South China Sea have issued official charts 
or lists of geographic coordinates showing the outer limit lines of their EEZ 
claims as required by Article 75 of the LOSC. However, the outer limits of the 
EEZ claims of Malaysia and Vietnam are shown on the maps contained in 
their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS).22 Brunei, China, the Philippines and Taiwan have not issued charts or 
21 Adapted from Fig. 2.11 in Clive Schofield, ‘Defining the “Boundary” between Land and 
Sea: Territorial Sea Baselines in the South China Sea’, in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and 
Robert Beckman (eds), The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, UK, forthcoming, 2014).
22 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental 
Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: 
Joint Submission by Malaysia and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Executive Summary 
(6 May 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm; accessed 5 April 2014.
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coordinates indicating the outer limit of their EEZ claims. It is interesting that 
the Joint Submission of Malaysia and Vietnam shows a 200-nm EEZ limit for 
the Philippines.23
Several of the States bordering the South China Sea are adjacent to each 
other and agreements will be required to clarify their adjacent EEZ boundaries. 
Brunei seems to have settled its adjacent boundaries with Malaysia through an 
exchange of letters,24 and China and Vietnam have reached a partial boundary 
agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin.25 Additionally, Indonesia has delimited its 
continental shelf boundaries in the south-western part of the South China Sea 
with both Malaysia and Vietnam (see Fig. 1).26 The adjacent boundary between 
Malaysia and the Philippines is an especially difficult problem because of the 
historic sovereignty claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian State of Sabah.27
In May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a Joint Submission to the CLCS 
claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.28 Vietnam made a separate 
submission for an extended continental shelf further to the north, opposite 
23 Ibid.
24 Brunei Darussalam’s Preliminary Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its 
Continental Shelf, 12 May 2009, para. 10, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/brn2009preliminaryinformation.pdf; accessed 
5 April 2014.
25 Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and 
Continental Shelves of the Two Countries in Beibu Bay/Bac Bo Gulf (with maps) (Beijing, 
25 December 2000, in force 30 June 2004), 2336 UNTS 179.
26 Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement related to seabed boundary delimitation 
in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, on 27 October 1969. See Choon-ho Park, 
‘Indonesia-Malaysia (Continental Shelf)’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander 
(eds), International Maritime Boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston, 
1993) 1025–1027. The terminal points of the two lateral seabed boundary segments defined 
by Indonesia and Malaysia in the south-western South China Sea were subsequently 
connected to each other through a continental shelf boundary line agreed between 
Indonesia and Vietnam which was signed on 26 June 2003. See Agreement between the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary (26 June 
2003, in force 29 May 2007), in David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith (eds), International 
Maritime Boundaries (Volume VI, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011), 4,301–4,315.
27 Official Gazette, No. 2587 Appendix XVI, Republic of the Philippines Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1966, available at http://www.gov.ph/1966/02/07/philippine-
claim-to-north-borneo-sabah-vol-ii-appendix-xvi/; accessed 5 April 2014.
28 CLCS, Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (n 22).
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the Philippines.29 Brunei, China and the Philippines have either made 
partial submissions or submitted preliminary information indicating that they 
also intend to make submissions claiming an extended continental shelf in 
the South China Sea.30 China and the Philippines have objected to the Joint 
Submission of Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as to the separate submission 
of Vietnam.31
If Brunei, China and the Philippines make extended continental shelf claims 
in the South China Sea, they are likely to overlap with the claims of Malaysia 
and Vietnam. In addition, Malaysia and Vietnam are likely to object to their 
claims. Therefore, even if no maritime zones (such as the EEZ and continental 
shelf) are claimed from the disputed offshore islands, there will be substan-
tial areas of overlapping continental shelf claims between opposite States and 
adjacent States in the South China Sea.
 EEZ and Continental Shelf Claims from Offshore Geographic 
Features
The offshore geographic features in the South China Sea that meet the defini-
tion of an island in Article 121(1) are entitled in principle to an EEZ and con-
tinental shelf of their own.32 However, Article 121(3) provides that if they are 
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, 
29 CLCS Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: 
Submission to the Commission: Submission by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 
Executive Summary (7 May 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/submission_vnm_37_2009.htm; accessed 5 April 2014.
30 Brunei Darussalam’s Preliminary Submission (n 24); Preliminary Information Indicative 
of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles of the People’s 
Republic of China, 11 May 2009, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/preliminary/chn2009preliminaryinformation_english.pdf; CLCS Outer 
Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions 
to the Commission: Submission by the Republic of the Philippines, 19 July 2012, available 
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_phl_22_2009.
htm; CLCS Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the 
Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the People’s Republic of China, 
14 December 2012, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_chn_63_2012.htm; accessed 6 April 2014.
31 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia and 
Viet Nam to the CLCS (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011) and the Philippines 
(4 August 2009 and 5 April 2011); Communications Received with regard to the Submission 
made by Viet Nam to the CLCS (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011) and the 
Philippines (4 August 2009 and 5 April 2011).
32 LOSC Art. 121(2).
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they are not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. If it is not a rock within 
the meaning of Article 121(3), an island is automatically entitled to a conti-
nental shelf. If a State intends to claim an EEZ from an island or from other 
land territory, it must make a formal claim. As a practical matter, the simplest 
option would be for a Claimant to claim an EEZ from an island, as that would 
give it sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural 
resources of both the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters.33
For example, under its national legislation China claims an EEZ from 
the Paracel Islands,34 but it has not clarified the outer limits of its EEZ claim. 
China has stated that the Spratly Islands are entitled to an EEZ and continental 
shelf,35 but it has not indicated the baselines from which its maritime zones 
are measured or the outer limit of its EEZ or continental shelf claim from the 
Spratlys.
Indeed, none of the other Claimants have indicated whether they are claim-
ing an EEZ or continental shelf from any of the islands in the Spratly Islands, 
and Vietnam has not indicated whether it is claiming an EEZ or continental 
shelf from the Paracel Islands. The fact that Malaysia and Vietnam included 
EEZ claims only from their respective mainland coasts in their submissions 
to the CLCS implies that they are not intending to claim an EEZ or continen-
tal shelf from any of the disputed islands over which they claim sovereignty. 
However, they would arguably not be precluded from claiming an EEZ from 
the islands at some point in the future if they decide that it is in their interests 
to do so. If EEZ and/or continental shelf claims are made from any of the dis-
puted islands, they will overlap substantially with the EEZ claims and extended 
continental claims from the mainland territory and archipelagic baselines of 
the States bordering the South China Sea.
 Historic Title or Historic Rights inside the Nine-Dashed Line
When China attached its nine-dashed line map to its Note Verbale of 6 May 
2009 to the UN Secretary-General, questions arose as to the significance of the 
map to China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. The Note Verbale states 
that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
33 LOSC Art. 56(1).
34 China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18), Art. 2; Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art. 2.
35 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-
Viet Nam (n 22), China (14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard to the 
Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (14 April 2011).
204 beckman and schofield
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243
the relevant waters (see attached map)”.36 Under the LOSC, a State has sover-
eignty over islands and the 12-nm territorial sea adjacent to them. It also has 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources 
in the EEZ measured from the islands and to any continental shelf claimed 
from the islands. Therefore, if the term ‘adjacent waters’ is meant to signify 
areas of territorial sea while the phrase ‘relevant waters’ is intended to refer to 
an EEZ claimed from the islands, China’s statement as to its claims would be 
consistent with the LOSC.
The question has arisen as to whether China is claiming rights and jurisdic-
tion only in the EEZ measured from the islands or whether it is claiming rights 
and jurisdiction in all the waters inside the nine-dashed line. With respect to 
jurisdiction, some national legislation of China states that it applies not only in 
China’s maritime zones, but also in all other sea areas under the jurisdiction of 
the PRC.37 Some commentators have suggested that the “other sea areas under 
36 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet 
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009); Communications Received with regard to the Submission 
made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009).
37 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control over Dumping Wastes 
into the Sea Waters, 6 March 1985, Art. 3: “The present Regulations shall apply to (1) The 
dumping of wastes or other matter into the internal sea and the territorial sea, onto 
the continental shelf and into other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s 
Republic of China; . . . (3) The shipping of wastes or other matter in the internal sea, 
territorial sea and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China 
for the purpose of dumping.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
rotprocotcodwitsw934/; Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, 25 December 1999, Art. 2: “This law shall apply to the internal waters, territorial 
seas and the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves 
of the People’s Republic of China and all other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the 
People’s Republic of China.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
meplotproc607/; Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 2: “All productive 
activities of fisheries, . . . in the inland waters, tidal flats, territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones of the People’s Republic of China and in all other sea areas under the 
jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China shall be conducted in accordance with this 
Law.” Available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/
content_21917138.htm; Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
29 August 2002, Art 2: “All surveying and mapping activities conducted in the domain 
of People’s Republic of China and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s 
Republic of China shall comply with this Law.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/
legis/cen/laws/samlotproc506/; accessed 6 April 2014.
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the jurisdiction of the PRC” could refer to the all of the sea areas inside the 
nine-dashed line.38
China issued a second Note Verbale on 11 April 2011. Some writers have argued 
that the language used in this second Note Verbale suggests that China is also 
claiming historic rights to resources in all the areas inside the nine-dashed 
line.39 However, the Note Verbale does not use the phrase ‘historic rights’. Also, 
there appears to be no other official statement from the Chinese Government 
claiming that it has historic rights in the waters inside the nine-dashed line. 
The only reference to historic rights in any official document is that in Article 
14 of China’s national legislation on the EEZ, which states that “[t]he provi-
sions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s Republic 
of China”.40 However, that Act gives no indication as to where China may have 
historical rights.
Nevertheless, some commentators from China and Taiwan have asserted 
that China claims historic rights and jurisdiction in the waters inside the nine-
dashed line.41 Some academics have opined that in practice China has been 
asserting not only historic rights to fish in the waters inside the nine-dashed 
line, but also historic rights to other maritime activities, including the right to 
explore and exploit oil and gas resources.42
The Philippines and Vietnam have taken the position that under the LOSC, 
States can only claim sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources 
in and under the water if they claim maritime zones from land territory, 
including islands.43 They do not recognise the legitimacy of any other claim to 
historic rights to resources in and under the waters inside the nine-dashed line. 
38 Nong Hong, ‘Interpreting the U-Shape Line in the South China Sea’, 15 May 2012, available 
at http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-the-
south-china-sea/; accessed 6 April 2014.
39 Zhiguo Gao and Bingbing Jia, ‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications’ (2013) 107(1) The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 98–124, at 
p. 108.
40 China—Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art. 14.
41 Yann-Huei Song, United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study of 
Ocean Law and Politics (School of Law of the University of Maryland, Baltimore, 2001) 73. 
Keyuan Zou, ‘Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice’ (2001) 32(2) 
Ocean Development and International Law (ODIL) 149–168, at pp. 160–163; Gao and Jia 
(n 39), at pp. 123–124.
42 Hong (n 38); Gao and Jia (n 39), at pp. 108 and 124; Keyuan Zou, ‘China’s U-Shaped Line in 
the South China Sea Revisited’ (2012) 43(1) ODIL 18–34, at p. 22.
43 See, for example, Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs Manila, 
SFA Statement on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, 22 January 2013, 
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They presumably take a similar position with respect to the assertion of claims 
to jurisdiction over activities in the waters inside the nine-dashed line that are 
not consistent with the jurisdiction of coastal States in the EEZ as provided in 
Article 56 of the LOSC.
It can be argued that the decision in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration supports 
the view that historic fishing rights of a third State in waters under the jurisdic-
tion of a coastal State were not necessarily extinguished by the LOSC and con-
tinue to be governed by customary international law.44 However, it is unlikely 
that the ASEAN Claimants would recognise China’s claim to historic fishing 
rights within the areas they consider to be part of their EEZs. They would in 
all probability maintain that they have sovereign rights to exploit the living 
resources in their EEZ, and that they need only to take into account “the need 
to minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually 
fished in the zone” when granting access to any surplus in their EEZ.45
Furthermore, Clive Symmons maintains that a claim to historic rights must 
meet the same general requirements as a claim to historic waters. That is, there 
must have been a formal claim, a continuous and effective exercise of the rights 
being claimed, and international acquiescence in the claim.46 It would be very 
difficult for China to prove that these requirements have been met in the South 
China Sea, as it would need to show that it formally claimed historic fishing 
rights in the EEZ of the other Claimants and that those States acquiesced in 
China’s claim. It would be even more difficult for China to assert historic rights 
to explore and exploit for hydrocarbon resources in the EEZs of other States.
China’s claim to historic rights in all the waters inside the nine-dashed line 
could possibly be considered and ruled upon in the pending arbitration case 
between the Philippines and China.47 Otherwise, the only other prospect for 
resolving this issue would be for the Claimants to enter into JDAs which spell 
out the right of the Claimants, including China, to exercise rights to resources 
in the areas subject to the JDAs. Such JDAs might be possible if they sidestep 
Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, available at https://www.
dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos; accessed 6 April 2014.
44 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA): Eritrea v. Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal 
in the Second Stage of the Proceedings—Maritime Delimitation (17 December 1999), at 
paras 109–11; available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160; accessed 
6 April 2014.
45 LOSC Art. 62(3).
46 Clive R. Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2008) 111–245.
47 PCA: The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, available at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529; accessed 6 April 2014.
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the difficult legal issues by not specifically mentioning either the nine-dashed 
line or the historic rights of China.
 Potential Impact of the Philippines v. China Arbitration
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v. China case48 will decide whether it 
has jurisdiction to hear the case, notwithstanding the declaration of China 
under Article 298 excluding disputes concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the LOSC relating to sea boundary delimi-
tations, or disputes involving historic bays or titles.49 If it does decide that it 
has jurisdiction, the Arbitral Tribunal could rule on several issues that would 
clarify how LOSC provisions apply to the complex legal disputes in the South 
China Sea.
First, the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on the Philippines’ assertion that claims 
to rights and jurisdiction in maritime space can only be made from land ter-
ritory, including islands. In the course of doing so, it may also confirm that 
reefs or rocks that are totally submerged are part of the seabed and cannot be 
subject to appropriation.
Second, the Arbitral Tribunal may also consider whether China has rights 
and jurisdiction in the waters surrounding disputed islands within the EEZ of 
the Philippines. In the course of addressing this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal 
may consider the issue of whether China has historic rights in such areas, even 
though historic rights are governed by customary international law rather than 
the LOSC. Article 321 of the LOSC provides that a tribunal having jurisdiction 
under section 2 of Part XV shall apply the LOSC and “other rules of interna-
tional law” compatible with the LOSC. Thus, even though the topic of historic 
rights is governed for the most part by customary international law rather than 
by the LOSC, the Arbitral Tribunal could decide how the concept of historic 
rights relates to the LOSC, and under what circumstances historic fishing rights 
in the EEZ of another State must be recognised or taken into account.
Third, the Arbitral Tribunal may decide whether the islands occupied by 
China are rocks under Article 121(3) that are not entitled to an EEZ and conti-
nental shelf of their own. In the course of deciding this question, it could also 
provide valuable guidance on whether any of the larger islands in the South 
China Sea would in principle be entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of 
their own.
48 Philippines—Notification and Statement of Claims on West Philippine Sea (n 43).
49 China—Declaration made after Ratification (25 August 2006), available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China Upon rat- 
ification; accessed 6 April 2014.
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Fourth, the Arbitral Tribunal may address the legal issues relating to the 
occupation of low-tide elevations, including rights and jurisdiction in the 
waters surrounding them.
Although attempting to discern the possible or likely outcomes of the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s deliberations would inevitably be highly speculative, if 
some or all of these issues are addressed, the Arbitral Tribunal could clarify 
some of the complex legal issues that are relevant to resolving the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea. However, any award of the Arbitral Tribunal 
will not address the two most fundamental legal issues which underlie the 
disputes in the South China Sea. First, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot consider 
which State has the better claim to sovereignty over any of the disputed 
islands because it can only consider disputes concerning the interpretation 
or application of the LOSC, and there are no provisions in the LOSC on how 
to decide issues of sovereignty. Second, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot decide 
how to delimit any EEZ boundaries between China and its neighbours, includ-
ing the EEZ boundary between the main archipelago of the Philippines and 
the disputed offshore islands. This is because the declaration made by China 
under Article 298 excludes the disputes on the interpretation or application of 
Article 74 concerning the delimitation of overlapping EEZ boundaries.
 Clarifying Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims around the 
Spratly Islands
 Maritime Claims from the Spratly Islands
None of the ASEAN Claimants have clarified whether they are claiming an EEZ 
from any of the Spratly Islands over which they claim sovereignty. This is not 
surprising, as it is arguably in their interests to maintain that all of the islands 
in the Spratlys are rocks within Article 121(3) that have no entitlement to an 
EEZ and continental shelf of their own. This would serve to limit the “areas 
in dispute” in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands to the 12-nm belt of 
territorial sea around those features which meet the definition of an island, 
that is, the naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at 
high tide.50 The result would be that the areas of overlapping claims associated 
with the islands would be limited to the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding the 
disputed islands. From the perspective of the ASEAN Claimants, this would be 
advantageous as it would leave them free to pursue marine resource develop-
ment activities in offshore areas proximate to their coasts in the South China 
50 LOSC Art. 121(1).
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Sea. However, Claimants would still need to delimit their adjacent maritime 
boundaries. This scenario would leave a substantial high seas “pocket” in the 
central part of the South China Sea located beyond 200 nm from the surround-
ing mainland and main island coasts (see Figs. 1 and 8).
From its Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009 and 11 April 2011, it seems that China is 
making two types of claims to maritime space in the South China Sea.51 First, 
it claims ‘sovereignty’ over the islands (and perhaps over other geographic fea-
tures) in the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, as well as to the ‘waters 
adjacent to the islands’, which most likely refers to the 12-nm territorial seas 
adjacent to the islands. Second, it claims ‘sovereign rights and jurisdiction’ over 
the ‘relevant waters’ as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. Given that the 
statement of 11 April 2011 also asserts that the Spratly Islands are fully entitled 
to a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf, we can probably assume that 
China is claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction to the natural resources in 
the EEZ (and continental shelf) measured from the islands.
As noted above, if the reference to ‘adjacent waters’ is read to refer to the 
territorial sea and the reference to ‘relevant waters’ is read to refer to the EEZ, 
China’s claims would be consistent with the LOSC and international law. 
However, China has not indicated which of the islands it believes are entitled 
to an EEZ, and it has not amended its national legislation to declare baselines 
around them, as it has for the Paracel Islands.52 Therefore, the extent of its EEZ 
claim from the islands, and the area of overlapping claims, is uncertain.
 A Game-Changing Option for China?
China could potentially trigger a paradigm shift in its disputes in the South 
China Sea if it were to formally declare an EEZ from the largest islands in the 
Spratly Islands.53 To make its EEZ claim clear, China could identify which 
islands in the Spratlys it believes are in principle entitled to an EEZ of their 
own. It could define the baselines for these islands, taking into account the 
provisions in the LOSC for baselines of islands on atolls and fringing reefs, as 
51 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet 
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard 
to the Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011).
52 China—Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea (n 8).
53 For an appraisal of hydrographic issues relating to the South China Sea islands, see David 
Hancox and Victor Prescott, ‘A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an 
Account of Hydrographic Surveys Amongst those Islands’ (1995) 1(6) International 
Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) Maritime Briefing 1–88. 
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well as the existence of any low-tide elevations situated within 12 nm from 
islands on the reefs.54
Since most of the islands in the Spratlys are very small and are located in 
relatively close proximity to each other, China could limit its EEZ claim to the 
largest islands and/or those which are vegetated, without having an overly 
dramatic impact on the scope of its claims to maritime jurisdiction based on 
claimed sovereignty over the disputed islands of the South China Sea. For pur-
poses of illustration, we have identified what appear to be the 12 largest islands 
based on past studies (see Fig. 3). They are all very small and the total land area 
of the 12 islands is less than two square kilometres. Despite their limited size, 
however, all 12 have vegetation and in some cases roads and structures have 
been built on them.
When Article 121 of the LOSC was drafted, numerous proposals were made 
regarding the tricky issue of distinguishing between islands capable of gener-
ating continental shelf and EEZ claims and mere “rocks” which cannot. Many 
of these proposals focused on criteria related to size and the presence of veg-
etation and/or water sources.55 Ultimately, no consensus was reached then 
and subsequently no definitive position has been determined through State 
practice or by virtue of an authoritative ruling from an international judicial 
body. Nonetheless, it is suggested that island size, coupled with the presence 
of vegetation, are useful, if not necessarily definitive, indicators of islands that 
may, in principle, be capable of generating continental shelf and EEZ rights.
Accordingly, it can be argued in good faith that the islands we have identi-
fied are not “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life 
of their own” within the meaning of Article 121(3). As a result, they would, in 
principle, be entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf of their 
own. Furthermore, the largest features among the Paracel Islands group have 
been identified and would similarly be entitled to generate EEZ and continen-
tal shelf rights in keeping with Article 121(2) of the LOSC (see below). Further, 
Pratas Island can be viewed as being of an analogous character.
Of the 12 largest islands in the Spratlys, Taiwan occupies Itu Aba (Taiping 
Island), the largest island and the only one reported to have a source of fresh 
54 LOSC Arts. 6 and 13.
55 Such proposals were advanced, for example, by the delegations of Malta and Ireland 
during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). See S.N. Nandan and 
S. Rosenne (eds) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 
(Volume III, Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 1995) 321–339. On the legislative 
history of Article 121, see also UNDOALOS, Régime of Islands: Legislative History of Part VIII 
(Article 121) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, New 
York, 1988).
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water. The Philippines currently occupies five features, all of which are located 
within what it terms the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG): Northeast Cay, Thitu 
Island, West York Island, Loaita Island and Nanshan Island. Vietnam occupies 
the remaining six: Southwest Cay, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, Sin Cowe Island, 
Amboyna Cay and Spratly Island. All of those islands occupied by Vietnam are 
within the KIG, except for Spratly Island, which is located towards the south-
western fringes of the Spratly Islands group. Although China does not currently 
occupy any of the 12 islands, as it claims sovereignty over all of them, it is likely 
to take the view that it has a right to claim an EEZ from them.
If China were to claim an EEZ from these 12 islands, it should issue charts 
indicating the geographic limits of its EEZ claim. In indicating the geographic 
limits it could give full effect to the islands toward the open sea and draw an 
equidistance or median line between the islands and the coasts of Brunei, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.56 Even though the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals provides that the maritime zones from 
small offshore islands should be given reduced effect or even ‘enclaved’ when 
delimiting maritime boundaries between large mainland territory and a small 
island, it is now well established that the starting point for courts and tribunals 
is almost always the equidistance line.57 Since the equidistance line is the first 
step in determining the boundary in the case of overlapping claims between 
offshore islands and mainland territory, a claim to the equidistance line would 
56 An equidistance line is a geometrically exact expression of the concept of a “mid-
line”, consistently at an equal distance from opposing basepoints. In the technical law 
of the sea literature, the term “median line” is sometimes used when referring to an 
equidistance line between two opposite States and the term “equidistance line” is 
used for an equidistance line between two adjacent States. However, as is observed in 
the International Hydrographic Organization’s TALOS Manual, “In practice, however, 
the concept of adjacent and opposition are often difficult to define and apply, but the 
method used to determine an equidistance line is the same whatever the relationship 
of the coasts of the States.” Consequently, the term ‘equidistance line’ is preferred in 
this Chapter. See International Hydrographic Organization (with the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission and the International Association of Geodesy), A Manual 
on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—1982, Special 
Publication No.51, (4th ed., International Hydrographic Bureau, Monaco, 2006) (TALOS 
Manual) Chapter 6, 3–4, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_iho_tech_
aspects_los.pdf; accessed 6 April 2014.
57 ICJ: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment 
of 3 June 1985 (1985) I.C.J. Reports 13; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001 (2001) 
I.C.J. Reports 40; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 
19 November 2012 (2012) I.C.J. Reports 624.
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be a good faith claim that is consistent with the LOSC and international law. 
Any claim to an EEZ from an island beyond the equidistance line could be 
viewed as an abuse of right under Article 300 of the LOSC. At the same time, 
China could make an EEZ claim from Pratas Island, which is currently occu-
pied by Taiwan but also claimed by China, and from the Paracel Islands, which 
are currently occupied by China but also claimed by Vietnam.
Fig. 3 is intended to demonstrate the effect of an EEZ claim from the 12 larg-
est islands in the Spratlys, as well as from the largest islands in the Paracels and 
from Pratas Island. It gives full effect to the islands in the direction of the open 
sea, making most of the area in the middle of the South China Sea subject to 
the EEZ regime rather than the high seas regime. The map also shows the theo-
retical equidistance line between the 12 islands in the Spratlys and the coasts of 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Moreover, the map illustrates 
full effect lines into the central part of the South China Sea as well as theoreti-
cal equidistance lines for the largest of the features among the Paracel Islands 
and for Pratas Island.58
For the purposes of this exercise, normal rather than claimed straight or 
archipelagic baselines have been used for the surrounding mainland and main 
island coastlines. This approach is consistent with past international judicial 
practice which has tended to ignore claimed straight baselines when deter-
mining the basepoints from which to construct equidistance lines.59 The area 
of overlapping claims would include a significant portion of the above-men-
tioned KIG claim area of the Philippines (illustrated on Fig. 1). It would also 
include some areas where the Governments of some of the littoral States have 
 
58 The names of the islands in the Paracel Island group that we believe would be entitled 
in principle to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own are annotated on Fig. 8 and 
listed in the next section of this paper, together with an analysis of the practical effect 
of such an EEZ claim. Note that Fig. 3 is designed to illustrate the location of the larger 
islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These are shown with shaded territorial sea 
areas around them. Note also that there are numerous other smaller features in these 
island groups that are entitled to generate territorial sea areas. These smaller features 
are not illustrated on Fig. 3 in order to highlight the location of the larger islands used 
to construct equidistance lines. See, however, Fig. 9. See also the Appendix to this paper, 
which contains an explanatory note summarizing the rationale for the maritime zones 
drawn from the islands illustrated in the figures accompanying this article.
59 It remains open to question how an international court or tribunal might treat archipelagic 
baselines defined in accordance with Art. 47 of the LOSC when constructing equidistance 
lines, as this issue has yet to arise before an international judicial body. 
213defining eez claims from islands
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243
granted concessions for the exploration of hydrocarbon resources.60 One nota-
ble impact of this approach is that a relatively small high seas pocket would 
exist in the north-eastern part of the South China Sea (see Fig. 3).
figure 3 Theoretical equidistance lines and remaining high seas pocket generated from larger 
islands in the South China Sea
60 For example, the Philippines, with respect to the Reed Bank area located to the north-east 
of the Spratly Islands group, Malaysia and Brunei, concerning areas off their territories on 
the Island of Borneo, and Vietnam, in relation to the Vanguard Bank to the south-west of 
the Spratly Islands.
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There would be several advantages to China if it made such a claim. First, 
its claim would be in conformity with the LOSC. Second, it would result in a 
large area of overlapping EEZ claims that would be subject to the provisions in 
Articles 74 and 83. The Claimants would be under an obligation to make every 
effort to enter into “provisional arrangements of a practical nature” such as 
JDAs.61 Furthermore, they would be under an obligation not to take any unilat-
eral actions that would jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement 
on the maritime boundaries.62 In short, this action would bring China’s mari-
time claims into line with both the LOSC and the claims made by the other 
Claimant States. Consequently, all of the Claimants would be negotiating on 
the same basis in international law and, in the authors’ view, this could result 
in a de-escalation of the South China Sea disputes and arguably clear the way 
for them to begin negotiations on the area of overlapping claims.
A further advantage to China if it followed this course of action is that the 
ASEAN Claimants may not have the option of invoking the compulsory pro-
cedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC on the 
settlement of disputes. China’s declaration of 26 August 2006 excludes any dis-
putes on the interpretation or application of Articles 74 and 83 from the com-
pulsory procedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV.63
As alluded to above, if China were to claim an EEZ from the largest 12 
islands in the Spratlys, the Philippines or Vietnam may challenge the claim. 
They could maintain that all of the islands in the Spratlys are rocks within 
Article 121(3) and not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf of their own. 
This would be a very difficult argument to make, unless a very strict reading 
of Article 121(3) were to be taken. Alternatively, the Philippines and Vietnam 
could respond by also claiming an EEZ from some or all of the same islands if 
they also claim sovereignty over them. If they were to make such a claim, they 
are likely to argue that islands can be given full effect in the direction of the 
open ocean, but that they should be given a substantially reduced or partial 
effect in the direction of their mainland territory or main archipelago and even 
“enclaved” or “semi-enclaved” (see Fig. 4). They could cite the jurisprudence 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of their position on the 
61 LOSC Arts. 74(3) and 83(3).
62 Ibid.
63 China—Declaration made after Ratification (n 49). The texts of the declarations of all 
States Parties to the LOSC are available on the United Nations Treaties Database (Status as at 
05 April 2014) at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en; accessed 6 April 2014.
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latter point.64 The result would be negotiations between China and ASEAN 
Claimants as to how to define the area of overlapping claims between the 
islands and the coasts of the ASEAN countries.
If China claimed an EEZ from the largest islands, it would benefit the ASEAN 
Claimants as well as China. The ASEAN Claimants would benefit because it 
would be clear that, at the least, the waters on “their” side of the equidistance 
line would not be areas of overlapping claims. Therefore, they would have 
undisputed sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in 
these areas.
 Clarifying the Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
If China were to make an EEZ claim from the largest disputed islands as 
described above, it would set the stage for negotiations to more precisely 
define the areas of overlapping claims. In some areas between the islands and 
the mainland coasts, the Claimants directly concerned may agree to follow the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and give these small, iso-
lated islands a reduced or partial effect, rather than full effect. The impact of 
according the larger islands of the Paracel and Spratly Island groups half and 
quarter effect is illustrated in Fig. 4.
In the areas of overlapping claims, the Claimants could then attempt to 
negotiate JDAs and other cooperative arrangements as called for in the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.65 Such coopera-
tive arrangements would be interim arrangements of a practical nature and 
they would be without prejudice to the sovereignty disputes over the islands 
or to a final agreement on the maritime boundaries.
If the Claimants were to enter into negotiations to cooperate in the areas of 
overlapping claims, they could sidestep most of the difficult legal issues, such 
as which State has the better claim to sovereignty over the islands, whether an 
extended continental shelf claim from the mainland takes precedence over 
or “trumps” an EEZ claim from an island, and whether a State has the right to 
legally occupy a low-tide elevation.
If it took this approach, China would not need to formally abandon its nine-
dashed line map or even issue a formal clarification of the nine-dashed line. 
 
64 ICJ: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta); Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain); 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (n 57).
65 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Phnom Penh, 4 November 
2002), available at http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/
declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea; accessed 6 April 2014.
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China could instead simply agree to begin negotiations on cooperative arrange-
ments in the areas of overlapping claims resulting from its EEZ claims from 
the disputed islands. The result would be that the ASEAN Claimants would, 
in principle, have sovereign rights over those maritime areas off their coasts 
up to the equidistance line with the largest disputed islands—something that 
presently appears to be contested. China could, however, still take the position 
that its “historic fishing rights” should be taken into account in any JDAs in the 
areas of overlapping claims. In addition, China could request that the ASEAN 
Claimants give access to its nationals to any surplus in the areas of their EEZ 
figure 4 Partial effect for the larger Paracel and Spratly Islands
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that are not subject to overlapping claims. The rationale for the latter request 
is Article 62 of the LOSC, which provides that when giving access to any 
surplus in their EEZ, coastal States should take into account the need to 
minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals habitually fished in 
the zone.
If China adopted this pragmatic position, it would be similar to that of the 
Philippines with respect to its historic claim to a territorial sea based on the 
1898 Treaty of Paris. Like the Philippines, China could take measures to bring 
its claims into conformity with the LOSC without formally abandoning its his-
toric claim.
 Clarifying Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims in the Other 
Areas in the South China Sea
 Gulf of Tonkin and Areas Surrounding the Paracel Islands
This section of the South China Sea includes Hainan Island and the southern 
coast of mainland China, the northern section of the coast of Vietnam, the 
Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, and the Paracel Islands. The sov-
ereignty and maritime disputes in this area are essentially between China and 
Vietnam, although Taiwan has a claim similar to that of China.
 Sovereignty Dispute
The Paracel Islands are located approximately equidistant from the coastlines 
of Vietnam and the Chinese island of Hainan. China, Taiwan and Vietnam 
all claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. China forcibly ejected South 
Vietnamese troops from the Paracels in 1974, and they are now occupied exclu-
sively by China.66 Vietnam continues to claim sovereignty over the islands, 
but China denies the existence of a sovereignty dispute.67 Vietnamese fisher-
men continue to enter the waters surrounding the Paracels, and the arrest of 
Vietnamese fishermen by China is a continual source of friction and tension 
66 King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1970: Issues, Decisions, and implications (Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford, 1987) 42–48; Cable News Network (CNN), ‘China and Vietnam: 
A Timeline of Conflict’, 28 January 2011, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
asiapcf/06/27/china.vietnam.timeline/; accessed 6 April 2014.
67 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 21 June 2012, 
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/
t945296.shtml; accessed 6 April 2014. Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam (n 18), 
Art 1.
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between China and Vietnam, as is the issue of exploration for seabed energy 
resources.68
Questions will remain as to the rights and obligations of the two Claimants 
in the waters surrounding the Paracels, including their rights in what would be 
internal waters or territorial sea of the islands. This is not an issue of overlap-
ping claims between opposite or adjacent States, but an issue of rights and 
jurisdiction in the waters surrounding islands over which both States claim 
sovereignty. Two principles of general international law that would clearly be 
applicable are the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and the 
obligation to resolve any disputes in a peaceful manner.69
 Maritime Claims
Vietnam has claimed an EEZ from the baselines along its coast.70 Vietnam has 
not issued any official charts or geographic coordinates indicating the outer 
limit lines of its EEZ, but the map accompanying its submission to the CLCS in 
May 2009 does indicate the outer limit of its EEZ claim.71 In May 2009, Vietnam 
made a separate submission to the CLCS claiming an extended continental 
shelf in the area off its east coast, southwest of the Paracel Islands.72 China 
has objected to Vietnam’s extended shelf claim, and has asked the CLCS not to 
consider it because of the existence of land or maritime disputes in the area.73 
One of the bases of China’s objection is that Vietnam’s claim may overlap with 
China’s claims in the same area.
China has claimed an EEZ measured seawards from its territorial sea base-
lines, including its claimed straight baselines fronting its mainland coast, as 
well as the straight baselines that it has defined around the Paracel Islands.74 
68 China Detains Vietnamese Fishermen in Disputed Water, 22 March 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/china-vietnam-idUSL3E8EM3YJ20120322; 
Vietnam Lodges China Protest over Claims of Attack on Fishermen, available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/vietnam-lodges-china-protest-over-claims-of-
attack-on-fishermen.html; accessed 6 April 2014. See also, for example, ‘Vietnam and 
China ships “collide in the South China Sea” ’, BBC News, 7 May 2014, available at http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27293314, accessed 23 May 2014.
69 Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945), 
Art. 2(3)–(4), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf; 
accessed 6 April 2014.
70 Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam (n 18), Art. 15.
71 CLCS, Joint Submission—Malaysia-Viet Nam, Executive Summary (n 22).
72 CLCS, Submission—Viet Nam (n 29).
73 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet 
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard 
to the Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011).
74 China—Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art 2.
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However, it has not issued any charts or geographic coordinates showing the 
limits of its EEZ claim in this area. China has submitted preliminary informa-
tion to the CLCS suggesting that it may make a further submission regarding 
extended continental shelf limits and such a submission may well involve this 
area.75 China’s claim could conceivably overlap with the extended continental 
shelf claim of Vietnam.
Woody Island, the largest island in the Paracels, hosts the Chinese admin-
istrative centre known as Sansha City, as well as military facilities, and is 
about the same size as the 12 largest islands in the Spratly Islands combined.76 
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that Woody Island is entitled to an 
EEZ and continental shelf of its own. Also, the information available suggests 
that several other islands in the Paracels are large enough to be entitled, in 
principle, to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.77
If an EEZ is claimed from the largest islands in the Paracels, it would extend 
east into the area beyond the outer limits of the EEZ claims measured from the 
mainland coasts of Vietnam and China. The EEZ generated from the Paracels 
would include Macclesfield Bank, but would not extend as far as Scarborough 
Shoal. An EEZ from the Paracels would also overlap with the EEZ claimed from 
the largest islands in the Spratlys. The result would be that most of the area in 
the middle of the South China Sea north of the Spratlys would be an area of 
overlapping claims.
The impact of an EEZ claim from the largest islands in the Paracels in the 
north-western part of the South China Sea is indicated in Fig. 5. In preparing 
this figure, the EEZ from the Paracels was measured from the largest islands, 
not from the straight baselines employed by China around the islands. This 
is because the straight baselines employed by China around the Paracel 
Islands are not in conformity with the LOSC.78 However, the area of EEZ 
that can be claimed from the Paracels is not significantly reduced if the EEZ 
75 CLCS, Preliminary Information—China (n 30), paragraph 10 “China reserves its right to 
make submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf that extends beyond 200 
nautical miles in the East China Sea and in other sea areas”; also Submission—China 
(n 30).
76 China Raises Administrative Status of South China Sea Islands, 21 June 2012, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/21/c_131668568.htm; accessed 7 April 
2014.
77 The following islands in the Paracels may be large enough to generate an EEZ of their 
own: Woody Island and Rocky Islet, Lincoln Island, Triton Island, Pattle Island, Duncan 
Island, West Sand, Money Island, Robert Island, North Island, Drummond Island, Tree 
Island, South Island, Middle Island, Passuh Keah and South Sand. See Explanatory Note 
in the Appendix to this paper.
78 See China’s straight baselines claims and other States’ responses (n 8).
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is measured from the largest islands rather than from the straight baselines 
connecting them.
Fig. 5 illustrates 12-nm territorial seas for the Paracel Islands themselves, 
together with theoretical equidistance lines between the Paracel Islands on 




























79 The continuous, that is, “joined up”, version of the nine-dashed line illustrated in the maps 
accompanying this chapter was formed by plotting the dashed line segments extracted 
from a map attached in the Chinese note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
in its response to Malaysia-Vietnam’s extended continental shelf submission and then 
interpolating a line to connect these dashes. There is therefore some inherent uncertainty 
in the precise location of these lines. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; accessed 7 April 2014. It is 
worth emphasising that China has never officially issued coordinates for the nine-dashed 
line nor depicted this line as a continuous one.
figure 5 Overlapping maritime claims in the North-western South China Sea79
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Once again, for the purposes of this exercise the straight baselines of both 
China and Vietnam have not been taken into account due to their excessive 
character and normal baselines have been used to generate theoretical equi-
distance lines. This provides an indication of what can be viewed as the maxi-
mum maritime area that could be realistically associated with these disputed 
islands under the LOSC and thus a plausible area of overlapping claims, as both 
China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. Additionally, a 
theoretical equidistance line between China and Vietnam ignoring the Paracel 
Islands is illustrated by proceeding seawards from the mouth of the Gulf of 
Tonkin into the north-western part of the South China Sea and out to the 
200-nm limit from normal baselines along mainland coasts (including Hainan 
Island), allowing 12-nm territorial sea semi-enclaves around features among 
the Paracel Islands, as appropriate.
Because the EEZ generated from the largest islands in the Paracel group 
into the potential central high seas “pocket” beyond 200 nm from surround-
ing mainland coasts would include Macclesfield Bank, this would solve a diffi-
cult legal problem for China. China has claimed sovereignty over Macclesfield 
Bank, even though it is a submerged reef that is not subject to a sovereignty 
claim.80 However, if Macclesfield Bank lies within the EEZ claimed from the 
largest islands in the Paracels, China would have a basis to claim sovereign 
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in and under the water in 
Macclesfield Bank. In such a case, it would not be necessary for China to pur-
sue its sovereignty claim over Macclesfield Bank, which is clearly a problem-
atic one to sustain in international law terms.
 Maritime Boundaries
China and Vietnam have reached agreement on a maritime boundary in the 
section of the Gulf of Tonkin extending seaward from their land boundary.81 
80 People’s Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18), 
Article 2: “The land territory of the People’s Republic of China includes the mainland 
of the People’s Republic of China and its offshore islands; Taiwan and all islands 
appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha 
Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all 
the other islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China.” This English translation is 
available in Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration, Collection 
of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (Ocean Press, 1998), 186. 
The English names of the four groups of islands in the South China Sea are Pratas Island 
(Dongsha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands), 
and Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands). 
81 Agreement between China and Viet Nam on the Maritime Delimitation in Beibu Bay/Bac 
Bo Gulf (n 25).
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Additionally, they reached an accord concerning fishing activities in specified 
areas straddling the agreed boundary line.82 Negotiations are continuing to 
extend the existing boundary south-eastwards, and in October 2013 the two 
States agreed to undertake joint seismic surveys in this area.83 The current 
boundary could be extended for a short distance without too much difficulty 
(see Fig. 5). However, it will be extremely difficult for the two States to extend 
this boundary too much farther because it will then intrude into the maritime 
zones of the disputed Paracel Islands.
The ocean space between the Paracels and the Vietnamese coast is likely 
to be a continual source of friction. China is likely to maintain that as the 
islands in the Paracels are entitled to an EEZ of their own, the waters between 
the islands and the Vietnamese coast are an area of overlapping EEZ claims 
between opposite States. Vietnam is likely to maintain that as it has sover-
eignty over the Paracels, all the waters between its coast and the Paracels are 
either its territorial sea or its EEZ.
Vietnam officially protested China’s use of straight baselines around the 
Paracels.84 However, it has not taken any official position on whether the 
Paracel Islands are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. Given 
the size of Woody Island, it may be in Vietnam’s own interests to recognise that 
the largest islands in the Paracels are entitled to an EEZ of their own.
In addition to overlapping EEZ claims, complex issues arise because of 
the outer continental shelf claim by Vietnam north-west of the Spratlys.85 
Vietnam’s claim to an extended continental shelf in this area will overlap with 
the EEZ claim of China from the Paracel Islands. China has indicated this in its 
diplomatic notes regarding Vietnam’s claim.86 This raises the issue of whether 
an extended shelf claim will “trump” an EEZ claim from offshore islands in the 
 
82 Agreement on Fishery Co-operation in the Tonkin Gulf between the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Beijing, 
25 December 2000, in force 30 June 2004), in Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘Maritime Delimitation 
and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf ’ (2005) 36(1) ODIL 25–44, at pp. 35–41.
83 Teddy Ng, ‘China, Vietnam to set up Group to Explore Disputed South China Sea’, 
14 October 2013, available at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1331106/china-
vietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-south-china-sea; accessed 7 April 2014.
84 Daniel J. Dzurek, ‘The People’s Republic of China Straight Baseline Claim’ (1996) 4(2) IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin Summer 77–89, at p. 80.
85 CLCS, Submission—Viet Nam (n 29).
86 In its Note Verbale of 7 May 2009 objecting to a separate Submission of Viet Nam 
(n 29), China stated that “the above Submission by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
has seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea”.
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same area with regard to rights and jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil. 
The decision of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar case suggests that this is a possibility in some cases.87 If 
so, there may ultimately have to be separate EEZ and outer continental shelf 
boundary agreements in the area, although the prospects of this being realised 
in the foreseeable future are dim in light of the parties’ irreconcilable positions 
on sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.
 Prospects for Joint Development in Areas of Overlapping Claims
China and Vietnam seem to have only two options if they want an alternative 
other than continued uncertainty and friction. First, they can decide to take 
the issue of which State has the better claim of sovereignty over the Paracel 
Islands to an international court or tribunal, and once the sovereignty issue is 
resolved, they can attempt to negotiate an EEZ boundary agreement. It seems 
unlikely that China would even consider this option, given the fact that it con-
trols the Paracels, has invested heavily in them and does not even acknowledge 
the existence of a sovereignty dispute over them.88 It is also uncertain whether 
Vietnam would seriously entertain this option, given its own oft-repeated 
uncompromising position, analogous to China’s, regarding sovereignty over 
the Paracels.89
The second option would be to agree, either formally or informally, to set 
aside the sovereignty dispute over the Paracels and to try to reach an agree-
ment on a combination of maritime boundaries and JDAs in areas of overlap-
ping maritime claims. For example, the existing maritime boundary agreement 
between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin could be extended from 
the terminus of their existing agreement in a south-eastward direction until 
a potential tripoint between the mainland coasts (including Hainan Island) 
and a full effect equidistance line involving the Paracel Islands, without undue 
87 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): Dispute Concerning the Maritime 
Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), 
Judgment of 14 March 2012, paras 463–474, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf; accessed 7 April 
2014.
88 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 21 June 21 2012 
(n 67).
89 See, for example, Note from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
86/HC-2009, 18 August 2009, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; accessed 7 April 
2014.
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difficulty (see Fig. 5). Additionally, without either China or Vietnam formally 
giving up their respective sovereignty claims to the Paracels, JDAs could be 
reached in the areas of overlapping claims between the disputed islands and 
the mainland coasts of the parties.
Under such a scenario, it is conceivable that each side might have a greater 
share in the joint zone on “their” side of the theoretical line ignoring the influ-
ence of the Paracel Islands. Moreover, Vietnam and China could agree to 
jointly develop the resources in areas to the south-east of the Paracels, includ-
ing Macclesfield Bank.90 It is recognised that the compromises and conces-
sions require significant reserves of political will. Accordingly, the potential 
scenarios outlined here are likely to prove difficult to realise in practice. The 
above suggestions are not, however, intended as a proposed solution, but 
as examples of the sort of options available to the two States in a negotiat-
ing context where the primary objective is to achieve a mutually beneficial 
solution in an area that will otherwise be a protracted source of tension and 
potential conflict.
 Area between the Philippines and Taiwan and China
The north-east section of the South China Sea is bordered by China and 
Taiwan in the north and the Philippines in the east. There is one significant 
offshore atoll in the area, Pratas Island. The Pratas Island consists of a number 
of features located on an atoll that is 2.8 km long and 0.865 km wide, located 
about 140 nm off the coast of China and about 240 nm west of Taiwan.91 Pratas 
Island is claimed by China and Taiwan, and occupied by Taiwan. Given the size 
of Pratas Island, it can be argued in good faith that it is not a rock within the 
meaning of Article 121(3) of the LOSC, but an island entitled, in principle, to an 
EEZ and continental shelf of its own.
 Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
The Philippines claims an EEZ from its archipelagic baselines.92 This produces 
an area of overlapping EEZ claims between opposite States which would be 
90 If the Philippines claimed an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm from its 
archipelago, some of its extended continental shelf area might overlap with the EEZ 
generated from the Paracel Islands, which may include Macclesfield Bank.
91 Tungsha Atolls (Pratas), available at http://island.giee.ntnu.edu.tw/islandengweb/007.
htm; Marine National Park Headquarters, Introduction to Dongsha Atoll National Park, 
available at http://marine.cpami.gov.tw/english/index.php?option=com_efpublication&
view=pdetailen&id=4&Itemid=79; accessed 7 April 2014.
92  Philippines—Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive 
Economic Zone and for other Purposes (n 18), Section 1.
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governed by Article 74 of the LOSC. The Philippines has submitted a claim to 
the CLCS for an extended continental shelf in Benham Rise, off its east coast, 
and has indicated that it intends to claim an extended shelf in other areas,93 
which may include the area in the direction of Pratas Island and China’s south-
ern coast. China’s future claim to an extended continental shelf in this area 
is likely to overlap with the future extended continental shelf claim of the 
Philippines.
Taiwan claims an EEZ from the straight baselines around its main island. 
It also claims an EEZ from the Pratas Island, using a combination of normal 
baselines and straight baselines.94 This area of overlapping claims includes the 
Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines, which is a major route for 
international navigation. Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC. Therefore, it is not 
eligible to submit an extended continental shelf claim to the CLCS.
The overlapping EEZ claims in the area of Luzon Strait involve Taiwan and 
the Philippines, because Taiwan has effective control of Taiwan Island and 
Pratas Island. To define the possible EEZ boundary in this sector of the South 
China Sea, an equidistance line can be drawn between Taiwan and Pratas 
Island on one side, and the nearest Philippine islands on the other side (see 
Fig. 6). If the equidistance lines were drawn from basepoints on the largest 
islands rather than from the straight baselines, it would avoid any problems 
relating to the legality of the baselines employed by Taiwan. In this context it 
can be observed that the Philippines would be likely to push for recognition 
of its archipelagic baselines. However, although this would likely be a point 
of discussion, the influence of the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines 
on the construction of the theoretical equidistance line is marginal, because 
an equidistance line constructed from basepoints on the islands would be the 
almost the same as one constructed from the archipelagic baselines.
The fact that the Taiwan’s use of straight baselines may not be in com-
pliance with the LOSC is not likely to have a significant effect on securing 
an agreement on the EEZ boundary (or a provisional fisheries enforcement 
line) between Taiwan and the Philippines, because the baselines need not be 
taken into account in the negotiations of the EEZ boundary. As Bautista and 
Schofield have noted, if a theoretical equidistance line is constructed between 
the Philippines and Taiwan, it would proceed from an eastern tripoint where 
93 CLCS, Submission—Philippines (n 30).
94 Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18), 
Art 4; Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (n 18), Art 
2; Territorial Sea Baseline, Outer Limits of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Amended, 26 November 2009, available at http://navy.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.
aspx?cnid=844&p=38637&Level=1; accessed 7 April 2014.
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the claims of Taiwan and the Philippines meet those generated from Japan’s 
Sakishima Islands group, then proceed through the Bashi Channel in the 
Luzon Strait into the South China Sea “proper” (see Fig. 6).95
Further to the south-west, a theoretical equidistance line between China 
and the Philippines relies on basepoints located on Pratas Island on one side 
and the western coast of the major Philippine island of Luzon on the other. In 
light of the small size and thus restricted coastal front of Pratas Island in com-
parison to Luzon, if maritime boundary delimitation negotiations were ever 
initiated with China/Taiwan, the Philippines would be highly likely to argue 
that Pratas Island be accorded a substantially reduced effect, if not entirely 
ignored and “enclaved” within their territorial sea areas. Further, if a theoreti-
cal equidistance line is generated between the mainland coast of China and 
the Philippines, baseline issues and particularly the questionable straight base-
lines of China fronting its mainland coast would likely prove to be key points 
of discussion. The Philippines would be likely to insist that any equidistance 
line be measured from China’s coast, that is, from its normal baselines, rather 
than from its straight baselines (see Fig. 6). The maritime area lying between 
an equidistance line according full weight to the Paracel Islands and one giv-
ing them nil effect and, moreover, ignoring the potential influence of China’s 
claimed straight baselines, represents a theoretical area of overlapping mari-
time claims. As illustrated in Fig. 6, Pratas Island also has a potential impact 
on the scope of the above-mentioned high seas pocket in the northern-central 
part of the South China Sea.
 Prospects for Joint Development in Areas of Overlapping Claims
Special legal problems arise in reaching an agreement on the EEZ boundary in 
this area because of the legal status of Taiwan. The position of the Governments 
of both China and Taiwan is that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China. 
The Republic of China Government on Taiwan is recognised by a small num-
ber of States as the legitimate government of China. The People’s Republic of 
China Government in Beijing represents China in the United Nations. Taiwan 
was not invited to participate in the negotiation and signing of the LOSC 
and it was unable to become a party to it.96 The Philippines, like the other 
95 See Lowell Bautista and Clive Schofield, ‘Philippine-China Border Relations: Cautious 
Engagement Amidst Tensions’, in Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin and Clive H. Schofield 
(eds) Beijing’s Power and China’s Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia (M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 
Armonk/New York, 2012) 235–250, at pp. 237–238. See also, Prescott and Schofield (n 14), 
at p. 434.
96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘Declaration of the Republic of 
China on the Outer Limits of Its Continental Shelf ’ (12 May 2009), available at http://
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ASEAN member States, follows a ‘One China Policy’ under which it officially 
recognises that Taiwan is part of China.97 This makes it extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, for the Philippines to negotiate an EEZ boundary with Taiwan 
in this area. China is likely to object if the Philippines and Taiwan enter into 
www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/ad125edc-048e-45de-93bc-
11427232687b?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781&opno=84ba3639-be42-
4966-b873-78a267de8cf1; accessed 7 April 2014.
97 Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, Taiwan-Philippine Relations, 
available at http://www.roc-taiwan.org/PH/ct.asp?xItem=57628&CtNode=4705&mp=272
&xp1; accessed 7 April 2014.
figure 6 Overlapping maritime claims in the North-eastern South China Sea
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formal maritime boundary negotiations because it would be contrary to the 
‘One China Policy’.
On the other hand, the Taipei authorities, not the Beijing authorities, are 
in effective control not only of Pratas Island, but arguably also of the waters 
in this area, both in the vicinity of Taiwan itself, but also proximate to Pratas 
Island; and Taiwanese fishing vessels fish in these waters. Therefore, for an 
agreement to be effective, Taiwan would have to be a party to it, or at least 
not challenge it. In this context, it is perhaps noteworthy that Taiwan was able 
to conclude a joint fisheries agreement with Japan in April 2013 in respect 
of parts of the southern East China Sea—suggesting the possibility of an 
analogous arrangement being applied to parts of the north-eastern South 
China Sea.98
It has been reported that following an incident in 2013, in which the 
Philippines coast guard fired on a Taiwanese fishing vessel and killed a 
Taiwanese fisherman, the Taiwan authorities have requested the Philippines 
authorities to enter into some kind of provisional arrangement with respect 
to fishing in these waters in order to prevent potential conflicts in the area of 
overlapping EEZ claims.99 Any arrangement must be consistent with the ‘One 
China Policy’ so that it does not raise an objection from China. The dispute 
98 The agreement does, however, exclude the 12-nm territorial waters of the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and its conclusion is without prejudice to the parties’ 
positions concerning that dispute. See Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘Taiwan, Japan ink fisheries 
agreement’, Taipei Times, 11 April 2013. Available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
front/archives/2013/04/11/2003559323/2; accessed 7 April 2014.
99 Philippines and Taiwan have agreed to: refrain from using force in enforcing fisheries 
laws and regulations, inform each other of their respective maritime law enforcement 
procedures; establish a mechanism for prompt notification when an enforcement 
operation is underway against any fishing vessel of the other party, and set up a mechanism 
for the prompt release of detained fishing vessels and their crews. See the Press Release of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 8 August 2013, available 
at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/eb8081fd-8616-4263-
8b96-f443c63b3294?arfid=12e3ae93-5bcb-43a6-90cb-05ff0268cafc&opno=3874e0ce-
d467-4f72-b271-a5af8d47ab33; See also Camille Diola, ‘Taiwan Ready to Revive 
Fishery Talks with Philippines’, 8 August 2013, available at http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2013/08/08/1066891/taiwan-ready-revive-fishery-talks-philippines; Elaine Hou, 
‘Taiwan, Philippines to Set Up Working Group for Fishery Issues’, 22 October 2012, 
available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201310220048.aspx; Kelvin Huang and James 
Lee, ‘Foreign Ministry Reports Progress in Taiwan-Philippines Fishery Talks’, 28 October 
2013, available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201310280016.aspx; accessed 7 April 
2014.
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settlement procedures in Part XV will not be relevant to any dispute between 
the Philippines and Taiwan because Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC.
A further potential complication in this area is the fact that the theoreti-
cal equidistance lines outlined above and illustrated in Fig. 6 cut through the 
Philippines Treaty Limits area or rectangular “box”. This may lead to complica-
tions in pursuing negotiations, particularly towards maritime boundary delim-
itation, on the Philippines domestic front.100
In conclusion, this area of the South China Sea presents issues of bound-
ary delimitation and fisheries cooperation between China, Taiwan and the 
Philippines which are complicated in particular by the status of Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that joint arrangements and other provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature could be agreed upon, for example in rela-
tion to fisheries resources, as has already occurred in parts of the East China 
Sea, if the governments concerned recognise their common interests and can 
agree on practical steps to cooperate in this area.
 Scarborough Shoal Area
Scarborough Shoal (or Reef) is located approximately 124 nm from the 
Philippines, well within the EEZ claimed by the Philippines from its main 
archipelago.101 Scarborough Shoal is a large atoll with a lagoon of about 150 
km² surrounded by a reef.102 Most of the reef is either completely submerged 
or above water only at low tide, but it contains four to six small rocks which are 
permanently above water at high tide.103 Some Chinese writers have claimed 
that it is part of Macclesfield Bank,104 but given the distance from Macclesfield 
100 See discussion in text at footnotes supra 9–16; Also see Bautista and Schofield (n 95), at 
pp. 238 and 242–243.
101 Republic of the Philippine, Official Gazette, ‘Philippines Position on Bajo de Masinloc 
(Scarborough Shoal) and the Waters within its Vicinity’ Department of Foreign Affairs 
(18 April 2012), available at http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-
de-masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity/; accessed 7 April 2014.
102 Keyuan Zou, ‘Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?’ (1999) 
7(2) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 71–81, at p. 71.
103 Ibid.; Philippines Position on Bajo de Masincloc (n 101). The relevant British Admiralty 
Sailing Directions (Pilot) describe Scarborough Reef as being “step-to on all sides and 
consists of a narrow belt of coral enclosing a lagoon of clear blue water”; South Rock, at 
3m high, is the “tallest rock” located at the south-east extremity of the reef. See United 
Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions: China Sea Pilot (Volume 2, 
9th ed., UKHO, Taunton, 2010) 74.
104 Zou (n 102), at p. 71; Keyuan Zou, ‘The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the 
South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the 
Spratly Islands’ (1999) 14(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (IJMCL) 27–55, 
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Bank and the depth of the waters in the area between them, it is difficult to 
argue that it is geographically part of Macclesfield Bank.
The rocks in the Scarborough Shoal are very small and contain no vegeta-
tion. Consequently, they appear to be a classic case of “rocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”. Following an incident 
in 2012, in which a naval vessel of the Philippines arrested Chinese fishing ves-
sels in the lagoon, China has allegedly taken ‘effective control’ of the atoll.105 It 
reportedly has coast guard vessels in the area and allegedly does not allow ves-
sels from the Philippines to enter the lagoon.106
 Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
The Philippines has claimed an EEZ from the archipelagic baselines surround-
ing its main archipelago.107 Although it has yet to issue charts or geographic 
coordinates setting out the outer limit lines of its EEZ, an EEZ claim from its 
archipelagic baselines would be consistent with the LOSC, and would include 
the waters around Scarborough Shoal.
China, Taiwan and the Philippines all claim sovereignty over Scarborough 
Shoal and over the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding it.108 The disputes con-
cerning Scarborough Shoal are essentially disputes between the Philippines 
at p. 28; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 
‘Huangyan Dao Shi Wen (Ten Basic Questions regarding the Scarborough Shoal)’, 16 June 
2012, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceph/chn/zgxw/t941671.htm; accessed 
7 April 2014.
105 M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Island Strategy: “Redefine the Status Quo” ’, 1 November 2012, 
available at http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-
status-quo/; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 
1 July 2013, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ 
2511_665403/t1055206.shtml; accessed 7 April 2014.
106 Jojo Malig, ‘China Claims Control of Scarborough Waters’, 24 May 2012, available at http://
www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/05/24/12/china-claims-control-scarborough-waters; 
Tarra Quismundo, ‘China’s Surveillance Ships back at Scarborough Shoal’, 8 January 2013, 
available at http://globalnation.inquirer.net/80007/chinas-surveillance-ships-back-at-
scarborough-shoal; accessed 7 April 2014.
107 Philippines—Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive 
Economic Zone and for other Purposes (n 18), Section 1.
108 Philippines—Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17), Section 2(2); Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Philippines’ Efforts in Pushing for the Establishment 
of the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to the Disputes between China and the Philippines 
in the South China Sea, 26 April 2013, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1035577.shtml; accessed 7 April 2014.
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and China, with Taiwan taking a position analogous to that of China. Because 
the rocks on the shoal are islands as defined in Article 121 of the LOSC (that is, 
naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at high tide), 
these rocks are subject to a claim of sovereignty.
None of the Claimants have designated baselines for measuring the territo-
rial sea from the Scarborough Shoal. If the rocks above water at high tide are 
situated on an atoll, the baseline for measuring the territorial sea may be the 
seaward low-water line of the reef.109 Because this is a very large atoll, using 
the seaward low-water line of the reef as the baseline could significantly 
increase the area of territorial sea surrounding the shoal. Also, the waters 
inside the lagoon enclosed by straight baselines would be internal waters. 
Alternatively, if there are drying rocks on the atoll that are within 12 nm of any 
of the rocks that meet the definition of an island, the drying rocks would be 
low-tide elevations that can be used as basepoints in determining the base-
lines from which the territorial sea would be measured.110
Two major issues concerning Scarborough Shoal are not governed by the 
LOSC, but by general principles of international law. First, which State has 
the better claim to sovereignty over the islands? Second, what are the rights 
and obligations of the Claimants in the waters surrounding the disputed 
islands?
 Relevance of LOSC Dispute Settlement Procedures
The most contentious issue with respect to Scarborough Shoal, other than 
the sovereignty dispute, is the legal status of the islands and their entitle-
ment to maritime zones. The Philippines’ legislation on baselines states that 
Scarborough Shoal is governed by the regime of islands in Article 121 of the 
LOSC, without stating how Article 121 would apply.111 However, the position of 
the Philippines in its arbitration case with China is that Scarborough Shoal is 
not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf of its own because the small rocks 
fall within Article 121(3) of the LOSC, which provides that “rocks which can-
not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” shall have no 
EEZ or continental shelf.112 This issue is important to the Philippines because 
Scarborough Shoal is situated in the EEZ which the Philippines claims from 
its archipelagic baselines. If the rocks are entitled only to a 12-nm territorial 
 
109 LOSC Art. 6.
110 LOSC Art. 13.
111 Philippines—Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17), Section 2(2).
112 Philippines—Notification and Statement of Claims on West Philippine Sea (n 43).
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sea, then the only ‘disputed waters’ where China could claim any rights would 
be the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding the islands. The waters seaward of 
the outer limit of Scarborough Shoal’s territorial sea would be the EEZ of the 
Philippines, where it has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural 
resources (see Fig. 6).
On the other hand, if the Arbitral Tribunal were to hold that the islands 
in the Scarborough Shoal are in principle entitled to an EEZ of their own, an 
issue of overlapping EEZ would arise. It would then be a case of delimitation 
of the EEZ boundaries between opposite States, which is governed by Article 
74. Given that China has exercised its right under Article 298 to opt out of the 
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions for disputes on the inter-
pretation or application of Article 74, this issue would have to be resolved in 
bilateral negotiations.
 Conclusion on Scarborough Shoal
The area around Scarborough Shoal provokes a bilateral problem between 
China and the Philippines. Some of the issues concerning the waters in and 
around the shoal could be resolved by the Arbitral Tribunal in the pending 
case between the Philippines and China if it decides that it has jurisdiction 
to hear the case. On the other hand, it might be possible for the two States to 
settle the case before an Award is issued by the Arbitral Tribunal. The issues 
concerning Scarborough Shoal are fairly straightforward compared to many 
areas in the South China Sea. If China and the Philippines could establish the 
necessary trust and political will, it might be possible for them to reach an ami-
cable arrangement with respect to fishing in and around Scarborough Shoal, 
provided such arrangements, like all provisional arrangements, are without 
prejudice to the underlying sovereignty disputes and a final agreement delim-
iting the maritime boundaries.113
 Indonesia’s EEZ Boundaries off the Natuna Islands
There are no disputed islands in the south-western-most section of the South 
China Sea. Indonesia has undisputed sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.
 Area of Overlapping Maritime Claims
Indonesia has agreements delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in this 
area with Malaysia to both the east and west and with Vietnam to the north.114 
113 LOSC Arts. 74(3) and 83(3).
114 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Indonesia 
on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the two Countries (27 October 
233defining eez claims from islands
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243
Indonesia negotiated these agreements in 1969 and 2003, respectively. 
Although the area encompassed by China’s nine-dashed line map cuts across 
these agreed continental shelf boundaries, as illustrated on Fig. 7, no available 
record indicates that China has objected to Indonesia’s boundary agreements 
with Malaysia and Vietnam.115 This raises the issue of whether, because of its 
silence, China is precluded from asserting any rights to resources on the conti-
nental shelf in this area, even though the area is partially inside China’s nine-
dashed line.
Indonesia’s claim to an EEZ in this area extends beyond the limits of its con-
tinental shelf boundary agreements with Malaysia and Vietnam.116 This indi-
cates that Indonesia is not prepared to use the continental shelf boundaries to 
delimit its EEZ boundaries with Malaysia and Vietnam. Therefore, Indonesia 
must negotiate bilateral agreements with its neighbours setting out the EEZ 
boundaries (see Fig. 7).
 1969); Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf Boundary (26 June 2003, in force 29 May 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/IDN.htm; accessed 7 April 
2014.
115 For example, Oegroseno, referring to the continental shelf boundary agreed between 
Indonesia and Malaysia in 1969 (n 114), states unequivocally that “[n]ot a single country 
has challenged the validity of this 45 year-old treaty that divides rather significantly 
certain segments of the SCS [South China Sea]”. See Arif Havas Oegroseno, ‘Indonesia, 
South China Sea and the 11/10/9-dashed lines’, Jakarta Post, 9 April 2014. Available at 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/09/indonesia-south-china-sea-and-11109-
dashed-lines.html; accessed 15 April 2014.
116 Indonesia—Act No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone, 18 October 
1983, Art 2, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/IDN_1983_Act.pdf; that Indonesia’s EEZ claim extends beyond its agreed 
continental shelf boundaries with neighbouring States is confirmed by reference to 
official Indonesian government mapping, notably its National Map which is issued on an 
annual basis and which clearly illustrates an Indonesian EEZ limit that is further seaward 
than Indonesia’s agreed continental shelf boundary lines. See, for example, Bakosurtanal, 
The National Map of the Unitary States of Indonesia [Peta Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia] (generally referred to as Peta NKRI), 2013, Cibinong, Indonesia. The same limits 
are also reflected in depictions of Indonesia’s fisheries management zone or Wilayah 
Pengelolaan Perikanan (WPP), in keeping with the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries (MMAF) Regulation Number 1 of 2009 on Fisheries Management Areas, 
available at http://infohukum.kkp.go.id/files_permen/PER%2001%20MEN%202009.pdf 
(in Indonesian) accessed 7 April 2014.
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figure 7  Maritime boundaries and overlapping maritime claims in the South-western South 
China Sea
Indonesia has been resistant to any suggestion that it must negotiate a mari-
time boundary agreement with China because its maritime zones overlap with 
those claimed by China.117 However, if China were to claim an EEZ from the 
largest islands in the Spratlys and draw a full-effect equidistance line from the 
larger Spratly Islands, it would create an overlap with the north-eastern part of 
Indonesia’s EEZ claim. In such a case, Indonesia is likely to take the view that 
the small isolated and largely uninhabited Spratly Islands should be accorded 
a reduced effect so that the claims from the Spratly Islands would not overlap 
with Indonesia’s EEZ claim from the Natuna Islands.118
 Conclusions
The major obstacle which must be overcome before JDAs can be seriously con-
sidered is to reach agreement on the areas of overlapping claims where JDAs 
117 See in particular, Oegroseno (n 115).
118 See I. Made Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, ‘Indonesia’s “Invisible” Border with China’, in 
Elleman, Kotkin and Schofield (n 95) 60–79, at pp. 67–70.
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and other cooperative provisional arrangements can take place. At the present 
time, there is substantial uncertainty with respect to the areas of overlapping 
EEZ claims between the mainland coasts and the islands. This is because none 
of the Claimants have indicated which islands, if any, they believe are enti-
tled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. Furthermore, none of the 
Claimants have indicated the baselines on the islands over which they claim 
sovereignty or issued charts or geographic coordinates showing the outer limit 
of the EEZ claims from the islands.
Agreement on areas for joint development is not possible if China main-
tains that the area for joint development must include all of the ocean space 
within the nine-dashed line. On the other hand, agreement on areas for joint 
development is also not possible if the ASEAN Claimants insist that none of 
the disputed islands in the South China Sea are entitled to an EEZ and conti-
nental shelf of their own.
There are several advantages to pursuing discussions to agree on areas of 
overlapping claims where joint development can take place. First, the arrange-
ments in areas of overlapping claims would be without prejudice to sovereignty 
claims over the islands or final boundary delimitation agreements between the 
islands and the mainland coasts. Second, the difficult issues regarding the sta-
tus of the extended continental shelf claims and their overlap with EEZ claims 
from the islands could be avoided. Third, the Claimants could remain on the 
features they presently occupy, again without prejudice to a final settlement of 
the disputes. Fourth, it would not be necessary to determine the status of each 
and every geographic feature if Claimants could agree on which of the larger 
islands in the Spratlys and Paracels are entitled in principle to an EEZ and con-
tinental shelf of their own.
China could trigger a paradigm shift in its disputes in the South China Sea 
if it were to formally declare an EEZ from the largest islands in the Spratly 
Islands and Paracel Islands and issue charts indicating the outer limit of its 
EEZ claims from the islands. If China made such an EEZ claim, it would set the 
stage for serious negotiations on setting aside the disputes, defining the areas 
of overlapping claims, and pursuing negotiations for JDAs and other “provi-
sional arrangements of a practical nature” under Article 74(3) of the LOSC. In 
our view, such a move would go a long way towards both clarifying claims and 
de-escalating the South China Sea disputes.
The advantage for China in making such a claim is that it would be con-
sistent with the LOSC. In addition, it would leave a large area of overlapping 
EEZ claims that would be subject to the provisions in Article 74. The States 
concerned would be under an obligation to comply with Article 74(3) and to 
make every effort to enter into “provisional arrangements of a practical nature”, 
such as JDAs. Furthermore, they would be under an obligation not to take any 
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unilateral actions which would jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final 
agreement on the maritime boundaries. In other words, the unilateral claim by 
China would define the area of overlapping claims and establish a legal basis 
consistent with the LOSC for joint development in the area of overlapping 
claims. Another advantage for China if it followed this course of action is that 
the ASEAN Claimants would not have the option of invoking the compulsory 
procedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC on 
the settlement of disputes.
The ASEAN Claimants would also benefit if China were to exercise this 
option. This is because it would clarify which areas of their EEZs were not sub-
ject to overlapping claims. They could then exercise their sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in these areas without fear of any interference and without any 
prospect of their right to the natural resources in these areas of their EEZs 
being called into question.
If China defined its EEZ claim from the Paracel Islands, it would complicate 
its bilateral negotiations for defining its boundary with Vietnam. However, it 
would clarify the issues which China and Vietnam must address in this area. 
Clarifying the dimensions of areas of overlapping maritime claims involving 
the disputed islands represents an essential first step towards discussion on 
potential joint development areas. As illustrated by boundary delimitation and 
joint fishing arrangements between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
a solution may not be impossible.
The issues in the remaining areas in the other sectors in the South China 
Sea are far less complex. The Scarborough Shoal area is a territorial sover-
eignty dispute between China and the Philippines which could be set aside 
by provisional arrangements to jointly develop the fisheries resources in the 
waters in and surrounding the shoal. The area between the Philippines and 
Taiwan is a boundary delimitation dispute complicated by the role of Pratas 
Island, baselines issues and the legal status of Taiwan; however, it could be 
resolved through provisional arrangements between the three parties with 
respect to, for example, the joint development of the fisheries resources. The 
area off Indonesia’s Natuna Island is such a distance from any disputed islands 
that the degree of overlapping claims is constrained and is arguably of limited 
interest to China. However, if an equidistance line were constructed between 
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and the largest islands in the Spratlys, some overlap 
would appear to exist, and this may have to be addressed. Nevertheless, a much 
higher priority for Indonesia will be to negotiate its EEZ boundary agreements 
with Vietnam and Malaysia in this area.
In summary, despite its limitations, the LOSC provides a legal framework 
which the Claimants could utilise if they have the political will and trust 
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figure 8 Existing maritime claims and EEZ claim from largest islands (with equidistance 
lines) and 12-nm territorial sea arcs from rocks
 necessary to set aside the disputes on territorial sovereignty and maritime 
claims and begin serious negotiations on JDAs and other provisional arrange-
ments of a practical nature in the areas of overlapping maritime claims. The 
LOSC also provides a framework whereby all of the Claimants, including 
China, can pursue their national interests in the South China Sea in a man-
ner that is consistent with international law. The proposals advanced here 
offer an avenue whereby China’s maritime claims can be brought into con-
formity with the LOSC at relatively limited cost but potentially substantial 
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benefit to itself and to the other South China Sea Claimants. This would poten-
tially provide a platform for constructive discussions on cooperation and 
joint development in the areas of overlapping claims defined on the basis of 
the LOSC, which would be to the benefit of all parties to the South China Sea 
disputes.
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 Appendix: Explanatory Note on Figures
Fig. 1 is a version of the map prepared by Clive Schofield and Andi Arsana of 
the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) 
for the agora on the South China Sea in the American Journal of International 
Law (AJIL), Vol. 107, No. 1, January 2013, page 96. It was based on the map issued 
by the Geographer’s Office of the U.S. Department of State in January 2010, No. 
803425AI(G02257) 1–10. However, the authors determined that several features 
near Vanguard Bank which had 12-nm territorial sea arcs around them on the 
US map were in fact submerged. Therefore, these features were not included 
in the map for the AJIL. Subsequent analysis has led to the conclusion that 
other features are not above high-tide features and this is reflected in the other 
figures included in this article (see below).
Fig. 2 is adapted from Fig. 2.11 in Clive Schofield, ‘Defining the “Boundary” 
between Land and Sea: Territorial Sea Baselines in the South China Sea’, in 
S Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and Robert Beckman, eds, The South China Sea 
Disputes and the Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming, UK, 
2014). It illustrates that the impact of straight baseline claims is significantly 
more pronounced with respect to “additional” areas of internal waters and ter-
ritorial sea generated than in terms of expanding the limits of the EEZ.
Fig. 3 illustrates the effect if an EEZ were claimed from the largest islands in the 
South China Sea. In drawing hypothetical EEZ claims from the islands in the 
direction of the open sea in the central part of the South China Sea, the islands 
were given full effect by drawing 200-nm arcs from the islands. As indicated on 
the map, the result is that all of the South China Sea would be subject to EEZ 
claims, except for a relatively small high seas pocket in the north-eastern part 
of the South China Sea.
With respect to maritime spaces lying between the larger islands of the 
South China Sea and the surrounding mainland and main island coasts, over-
lapping maritime claims would result as there is predominantly less than 400 
nm between them. Consequently, in the direction of mainland coasts of the 
States bordering the South China Sea, theoretical equidistance lines were con-
structed between the islands and the surrounding mainland and main island 
coasts. The reason for this is that even if the islands are in principle entitled to 
an EEZ of 200 nm, the maximum extent of the EEZ that could be accorded to 
the islands would be that within a strict equidistance line drawn between the 
islands and the mainland coast.
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The 28 islands used for this exercise are 12 islands in the Spratly Islands 
group, 15 islands in the Paracel Islands group, and Pratas Island. These features 
were selected based on analysis of satellite imagery and information in the 
sailing directions issued by the United States and the United Kingdom and rel-
evant literature.119 Evidence suggests that these features meet the definition 
of an island in Article 121, that is, they are naturally formed areas of land sur-
rounded by and above water at high tide. The islands that were selected are 
the largest and/or are vegetated. Therefore, it can be maintained that they are 
not “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own 
that are not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that these features are capable, in principle, of generating an EEZ of 
their own”.
The insular features in the Spratly Islands group used to construct theoreti-
cal equidistance lines and 200-nm arcs were as follows (from largest to small-
est in estimated area): Itu Aba, Thitu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, 
Southwest Cay, Spratly Island, Namyit Island, Nansha(n) Island, Sand Cay, 
Loaita Island, Sin Cowe Island and Amboyna Cay.
The islands in the Paracel Islands group used for the same exercise were 
as follows: Woody Island and Rocky Islet, Lincoln Island, Triton Island, 
Pattle Island, Duncan Island, West Sand, Money Island, Robert Island, North 
Island, Drummond Island, Tree Island, South Island, Middle Island, Passuh 
Keah and South Sand. These features are the largest in the Paracel Islands 
group and all but West Sand appear to be vegetated. Given the relatively large 
size of West Sand, coupled with its connection to the reef on which Tree Island 
(which is vegetated) lies, West Sand was included as a basepoint for the pur-
poses of the present exercise.120 However, given its proximity to Tree Island, 
another of the larger Paracel Islands which is also vegetated, its influence on 
the theoretical equidistance line is minimal.
119 Hancox and Prescott (n 53); UKHO, Admiralty Sailing Directions China Sea Pilot (Volume 1, 
8th ed., UKHO, Taunton, 2010) 75–78; Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig, 
Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 1997) 
226–235; UKHO, China Sea Pilot, Vol. 2 (n 103), at pp. 64–73; and United States National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (ENROUTE) PUB.161, South China Sea 
and the Gulf of Thailand (13th ed., National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, 
2011) 5–14.
120 The relevant British Admiralty Sailing Directions (Pilot) note that West Sand is a “sandy 
cay” located near the west end of the reef on which Tree Island lies. See UKHO, China Sea 
Pilot, Vol. 1 (n 119), at p. 77.
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These features are annotated on Fig. 3. Also, note that for the purposes of this 
exercise, normal baselines were applied not only for the islands themselves, 
but also with respect to the surrounding mainland and main island coastlines.
Fig. 4 illustrates full, half and one-quarter weighting or effect accorded to the 
larger islands in the Spratly and Paracel Island groups identified in Fig. 3.
Figs. 5, 6 and 7 are larger-scale maps detailing maritime claims, including EEZ 
claims from larger islands, in the north-western, north-eastern and southern 
parts of the South China Sea. These maps, together with Figs. 8 and 9, illus-
trate the location of the larger islands of the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands 
groups used for the construction of theoretical equidistance lines by showing 
shaded territorial sea areas around them. Unshaded 12-nm arcs are shown with 
respect to smaller features which may meet the definition of an island under 
the LOSC, but which in our view are too small and barren to be inhabitable 
and entitled to an EEZ of their own (see below). Unshaded 12-nm territorial sea 
limits are also shown around mainland and main island coasts.
Fig. 8 shows the hypothetical EEZ claims from the islands and the equidis-
tance lines. As noted above, the islands used to generate the EEZ claims are 
shown with shaded 12-nm territorial sea circles around them, and unshaded 
12-nm territorial sea arcs are shown around other features which may meet 
the definition of an island under the LOSC, but which were not used to claim 
an EEZ because they are too small and barren to be inhabitable and entitled 
to an EEZ of their own. The number of features in the latter category is very 
uncertain because past studies and past maps are not consistent. Although 
the 2010 US State Department map has 12-nm territorial sea arcs around more 
than 50 other features in the Spratly Islands, our analysis of the previous stud-
ies and sailing directions indicates that 34 of those features are either clearly 
below water at high tide or the sources are inconsistent as to whether they are 
above water at high tide. Consequently, we have adopted a consciously con-
servative approach and exercised prudence and caution, drawing 12-nm arcs 
only around the 16 small features (in addition to the 12 larger islands identified 
above) in the Spratly Islands, which the previous studies consistently refer to 
as being above water at high tide. For similar reasons, we have drawn 12-nm 
arcs around Scarborough Shoal as there is consistent evidence that 4–6 small 
rocks on the reef are above water at high tide.
The features which we identified as rocks entitled to a 12-nm territorial sea 
of their own include Scarborough Shoal, as well as the following 16 features in 
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figure 9  Annotated map of South China Sea Islands
the Spratly Islands: Loaita Cay, Lankiam Cay, Sandy Cay, Collins Reef, Len Dao, 
Barque Canada Reef, Commodore Reef, Louisa Reef, Mariveles Reef, Pearson 
Reef, Royal Charlotte Reef, Swallow Reef, Central Reef, Cuarteron Reef, East 
Reef and West Reef. The following features in the Paracel Islands also meet this 
definition: Antelope Reef, Bombay Reef, Discovery Reef, Middle Sand, North 
Sand, Observation Bank, Pyramid Rock, Quanfu Dao and Vuladdore Reef.
These territorial sea limits associated with these features are shown on Fig. 8 
and all features mentioned above are annotated on Fig. 9 below. In light of 
the complex tidal regime of the South China Sea, coupled with uncertainties 
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and inconsistencies with respect to hydrographic surveying in the region, it 
is acknowledged that a number of additional very small features may exist in 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands which are, in fact, above the high water. Such 
features can most plausibly be categorised as ‘rocks’ within the meaning of 
Article 121(3) of the LOSC and therefore would be capable of generating 12-nm 
territorial sea limits.121 However, even if such additional insular features do 
exist in the South China Sea, it is the authors’ view that they would not qualify 
as islands capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights and therefore 
would not have a meaningful impact on the central arguments advanced in 
this article.
Fig. 8 also shows the nine-dashed line that is indicated on Chinese maps of 
the South China Sea. The dashes on the Chinese map are indicated in bold and 
are also connected by interpolated lines to illustrate what China’s claim is if it 
claims rights and jurisdiction over all of the maritime space inside the nine-
dashed line.122 It should be noted that there is inherent uncertainty related 
to both the location of the nine-dashed line and the interpolated interven-
ing lines shown “joining” the nine dashes up. No official coordinates of the 
dashed line have been published. The dashed line segments illustrated were 
extracted from a map attached in the Chinese note to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations in its response to Malaysia-Vietnam’s extended continental 
shelf submission and the intervening lines interpolated between them. This 
map therefore allows one to visualise the difference between the area inside 
the nine-dashed line and the area of overlapping claims that would result if an 
EEZ claim were made from the largest islands in the South China Sea.
121 In this context it is worth noting that, based on its past jurisprudence, the ICJ indicated 
in clear terms in 2012 that even the smallest island generates a 12-nm territorial sea. See 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (n 57), at para. 37.
122 Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia and 
Viet Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009). 
